Creating an Unprecedented Number of Precedents at the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims by Antweiler, Natsumi
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 60 | Issue 6 Article 6
Creating an Unprecedented Number of Precedents
at the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
Natsumi Antweiler
Copyright c 2019 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Natsumi Antweiler, Creating an Unprecedented Number of Precedents at the U.S. Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims, 60 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2311 (2019), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/
vol60/iss6/6
NOTES
CREATING AN UNPRECEDENTED NUMBER OF
PRECEDENTS AT THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR
VETERANS CLAIMS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2313
I. BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2315
A. How the VA Adjudicates Claims for Benefits . . . . . . . . . 2316
B. Why the Backlog Exists. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2318
C. Why Class Actions Are Insufficient to Remedy the
Situation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2321
II. THE BENEFITS OF PRECEDENTIAL OPINIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . 2322
A. Nature of the CAVC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2323
B. Merits of Nonbinding Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2324
C. The Downside of Having Limited Precedential 
Opinions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2325
III. SOLUTIONS FOR CREATING MORE PRECEDENTIAL 
OPINIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2327
A. Increasing Judges at the Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims Without a Ceiling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2327
1. Current Statutory Provisions Regarding Active and
Retired Judges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2327
2. Proposing a Statutory Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2328
3. Counterarguments and Justifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2329
4. Alternative Proposal: Expanding the Role of Retired
Judges. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2330
B. Mechanism to Convert Nonprecedential Opinions to
Precedential Opinions: Formation of a Special Reviewing
Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2331
2311
2312 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:2311
1. Justification for Creating a Special Reviewing
Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2332
2. How the Special Reviewing Process Works. . . . . . . . . . 2333
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2334
2019] CREATING PRECEDENTS AT THE CAVC 2313
INTRODUCTION
In February 2012, Mr. Conley F. Monk, Jr., a Marine Corps
veteran who served during the Vietnam War, filed a claim with the
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) for disability benefits
regarding his post-traumatic stress disorder and other disabilities.1
Initially, he was denied benefits because he had been discharged
under “other than honorable” circumstances.2 He later challenged
the VA’s decision and requested a hearing.3 Even three years after
his filing, the VA had not rendered a decision.4 Thus, Mr. Monk filed
a petition for a writ of mandamus with the United States Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC) and requested that the court
“order the Secretary of Veterans Affairs ... to promptly adjudicate”
his claim.5 Not only did he ask for his claim to be decided, but he
also requested that the CAVC certify a class “under a class action or
similar aggregate resolution procedure” so that other similarly-
situated veterans could also benefit from the decision.6 The CAVC
denied Mr. Monk’s claim, citing the Court’s long-standing decla-
ration that it did not have jurisdiction to hear class actions and that
it was “not permitted to go beyond the jurisdictional statute set
forth by Congress.”7 In April 2017, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit held to the contrary.8 The Federal
Circuit concluded that the CAVC had abused its discretion by decid-
ing that it lacked authority to certify and adjudicate class action
cases.9 The Federal Circuit stated that the CAVC had authority to
entertain class action lawsuits “under the All Writs Act, other
statutory authority, and the [CAVC’s] inherent powers.”10
1. Monk v. Shulkin, 855 F.3d 1312, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See id.
7. Monk v. McDonald, No. 15-1280, 2015 U.S. Vet. App. LEXIS 684, at *6 n.1 (May 27,
2015).
8. Monk, 855 F.3d at 1318.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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Although class action lawsuits may help the CAVC decide aggre-
gated cases, the prospect raises new and complicated issues. First,
there is the question of what rules should be adopted to certify a
class.11 Even if the CAVC were to adopt a Rule 23-type rule that
permits class action lawsuits,12 the court may be required to inter-
pret threshold class action requirements such as numerosity, com-
monality, typicality, and adequacy of the certified class.13 Because
disability and benefits issues are unique to each individual, it is
highly unlikely that a class can be certified.14 Although the CAVC
may theoretically hear class actions, it will not likely resolve any
substantive issues that the veterans seek to have addressed.15 For
example, the main issue that Mr. Monk sought the CAVC to address
was why the VA was taking so long to decide his case.16
Mr. Monk’s story—a poor, disabled veteran who put his life at
risk overseas and returned only to find himself “at another war” on
his own home turf against a system that was supposed to provide
him medical and financial assistance17—is not unique. In fact, his
case is just the tip of the iceberg: there are close to one million
claims pending at the VA.18 Although there is an immense backlog
which slows down the whole system, another issue is that only 1.8
percent of CAVC decisions are binding precedential decisions.19 If
the CAVC increased the rate of written, precedential opinions, then
11. Monk v. Shulkin, No. 15-1280, 2017 U.S. Vet. App. LEXIS 1543, at *2 (Oct. 26, 2017). 
12. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits class action lawsuits. FED. R.
CIV. P. 23(a). Individual parties or entities can be grouped together to create a class if the
affected persons are so numerous that joinder is impracticable, there is commonality and
typicality amongst the members, and if the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the class’s interest. Id. Because the CAVC is an Article I court, and not an Article III
court, the federal rules do not apply to it. Thus, Rule 23 is not binding on the CAVC.
13. See id.
14. See, e.g., Compensation: Types of Claims, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF., https://www.
benefits.va.gov/compensation/types-claims.asp [https://perma.cc/DYC7-39NM].
15. See Monk, 855 F.3d at 1314-15 (proposing that a class be composed of those “who had
applied for VA benefits, had timely filed an NOD, had not received a decision within twelve
months, and had demonstrated medical or financial hardship”).
16. See id. at 1314.
17. See, e.g., Alan Zarembo, VA Is Buried in a Backlog of Never-Ending Veterans Disability
Appeals, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-veterans-
appeals-backlog-20151123-story.html [https://perma.cc/SN7C-QJTX].
18. Michael Serota & Michelle Singer, Veterans’ Benefits and Due Process, 90 NEB. L. REV.
388, 390 (2011).
19. See infra Part II.A.
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it would increase the CAVC’s efficiency because it would create clear
rules, deter claimants from bringing forward unmeritorious claims,
and reduce the number of appeals.20 This Note proposes two mech-
anisms to create more precedential opinions at the CAVC: increas-
ing the number of judges,21 and establishing a new mechanism to
convert nonprecedential opinions into precedential opinions.22
Part I explains how the VA’s adjudicatory system functions—
particularly, it shows how this unique system also exacerbates the
backlog problem and how class actions will not suffice to remedy the
situation. Part II balances the advantages and disadvantages of
having more precedential opinions. Finally, Part III introduces two
proposals to create more precedents. First, it discusses the benefits
of increasing the number of judges and expanding the authority of
retired judges. Second, it considers a new mechanism for converting
nonbinding opinions to binding opinions.
I. BACKGROUND
Currently, there are over twenty million veterans who have
served the United States.23 Many veterans have paid the ultimate
sacrifice, but many more veterans have been left with mental and
physical scars.24 In return for the veterans’ selfless service, Congress
established the VA to provide veterans and their families important
resources,25 such as health care, a benefits program to compensate
injured veterans, and access to national cemeteries.26 This Note’s
main focus is to examine the veterans’ benefits system within the
Veterans Benefits Administration—a VA administrative body that
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Part III.A.
22. See infra Part III.B.
23. Veteran Population Projections 2017-2037, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF., https://www.va.
gov/vetdata/docs/Demographics/New_Vetpop_Model/Vetpop_Infographic_Final31.pdf [https://
perma.cc/KBG3-YVUS].
24. See U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, AMERICA’S WARS FACT SHEET (2017),
https://www.va.gov/opa/publications/factsheets/fs_americas_wars.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9HZ-
JMGP] (noting that, since the Revolutionary War, there have been approximately 700,000 in-
service deaths and 1.5 million nonmortal woundings).
25. See Serota & Singer, supra note 18, at 389.
26. See About VA, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF., https://www.va.gov/about_va/vahistory.asp
[https://perma.cc/J5KT-4SPY].
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distributes injury compensation benefits and services to veterans
and their families27—and to argue that the current system can be
improved to provide claimants a faster and more efficient decision-
making process. Although nearly 3.3 million veterans and family
members are currently receiving VA benefits, close to one million
claims are still waiting to be decided.28
A. How the VA Adjudicates Claims for Benefits
The VA claims adjudication process is like no other system in the
United States. Based on the precept that the claims system should
be favorable to military veterans,29 the VA includes flexibility in the
system which is intended to help veterans. For example, to preserve
the effective date of a claim, a veteran can just send an “intent to
file” claim which does not require any substantive claims.30 Further-
more, claimants are permitted to continuously submit information
before the VA makes a decision on the claim.31 Other flexibilities
require the VA to assist the veteran complete the claim application
(at no cost),32 and to give the claim a sympathetic reading.33 The VA
system does away with statutes of limitation34 and res judicata.35
27. Veterans Benefits Administration, About VBA, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF.,
https://benefits.va.gov/BENEFITS/about.asp [https://perma.cc/GWD2-EKSN].
28. See Serota & Singer, supra note 18, at 389-90. 
29. The system was “originally established as a way for a grateful nation to ensure that
those who had served in the military would be well-cared for if they were injured.” Victoria
Hadfield Moshiashwili, Ending the Second “Splendid Isolation”?: Veterans Law at the Federal
Circuit in 2013, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 1437, 1442 (2014). Hence, the government did not want to
create an adversarial system; rather, it was in the government’s interest that it did not
necessarily “win” the claims brought by the veterans, but that “justice [was] done” and that
“all veterans so entitled receive[d] the benefits due to them.” Id.
30. The VA allows veterans to submit “intent to file” claims, which only require the
veterans to give notice that they plan to file a claim. VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL § 12.4.2.2
(Barton F. Stichman et al. eds., 2017). The veteran does not have to go into the substance of
the claim in this “intent to file”; furthermore, the veteran is not required to file an actual
claim later on, if he chooses not to pursue the claim. See id. The intent to file is mainly used
to preserve the effective date of his claim. Id. 
31. See Moshiashwili, supra note 29, at 1444.
32. See id. at 1442-43.
33. See id. 
34. For example, even after exhausting each level of review, a veteran can provide new
and material evidence to restart the process on the same claim. See Serota & Singer, supra
note 18, at 399-401. The veteran can also challenge disability compensation benefits decisions
based on ratings of severity of the disability by claiming that a higher rating should be
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The VA also has a low standard of proof and provides the veteran
“the benefit of the doubt.”36
In addition to these flexibilities, the VA system provides five
different levels of review.37 A veteran (or a surviving spouse or
relative) commences a claim at the VA when the veteran files a
claim at a VA regional office (RO).38 The RO “processe[s], devel-
ope[s], and adjudicate[s]” the claim.39 Because the VA system is
nonadversarial,40 the VA is required to assist the veteran in gath-
ering evidence (for example, medical records and service records).41
The RO adjudicates the claim and decides whether to grant the ben-
efits to the veteran.42 If the RO denies the claim, then it provides the
veteran a Rating Decision to explain the decision.43 After the RO
files the Rating Decision, the veteran has the right to submit a No-
tice of Disagreement within one year.44 The VA must then respond
with a Statement of the Case which explains the Rating Decision in
further detail.45 At this point, the veteran can take several routes to
appeal the decision: the veteran can request that the RO conduct a
de novo review or file an appeal with the Board of Veterans’ Appeals
granted due to increased disability. VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL, supra note 30, § 5.1.1.
Otherwise, a veteran can also argue that the Board made a “clear and unmistakable error.”
See Moshiashwili, supra note 29, at 1444; see also VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL, supra note
30, at § 14.4 (“A unique aspect of the veterans’ benefits system is that once a claim has been
finally denied, a veteran can at any time attack the validity of that final decision and
potentially reverse VA’s determination.”).
35. Michael J. Wishnie, “A Boy Gets into Trouble”: Service Members, Civil Rights, and
Veterans’ Law Exceptionalism, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1709, 1720-21 (2017).
36. See Moshiashwili, supra note 29, at 1443 n.40.
37. DANIEL T. SHEDD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42609, OVERVIEW OF THE APPEAL PROCESS
FOR VETERANS’ CLAIMS 2-3 (2013).
38. See Moshiashwili, supra note 29, at 1439. Veterans can bring forward benefit claims
for health care, disability compensation, pension, education, and others. Wishnie, supra note
35, at 1719. At the time of writing, there were fifty-six regional offices in the United States,
Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. About VBA, supra note 27.
39. Moshiashwili, supra note 29, at 1439.
40. See Serota & Singer, supra note 18, at 398.
41. See Moshiashwili, supra note 29, at 1443.
42. VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL, supra note 30, § 12.6.3.3-4.
43. See Moshiashwili, supra note 29, at 1439.
44. VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL, supra note 30, § 12.7.1-2.
45. See id. § 12.10.1.
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(Board).46 Although the Board is an appellate body, it “has the power
to develop evidence and to find facts de novo.”47
If the veteran is still not satisfied with the Board’s decision, the
veteran can appeal to the CAVC.48 The CAVC is only able to make
legal determinations and to “affirm, modify, or reverse a decision of
the Board or to remand the matter, as appropriate.”49 Unlike the RO
or the Board, the CAVC is an adversarial body.50 Even so, the VA
system reserves the veteran’s right to appeal, and thus the system
is set up to put the veteran in a more advantageous position.51 In es-
sence, a veteran has “nothing to lose by appealing” to the CAVC.52
At this stage, if either party is upset with the CAVC’s decision, then
they both have the right to appeal to the Federal Circuit, and then
to the Supreme Court.53
B. Why the Backlog Exists
This system’s “most significant shortcoming” is the delay incurred
at each step of the review process.54 The VA claims processing sys-
tem’s backlog totals 900,000 claims across the United States, and
continues to grow.55 At the RO stage, the average process time is
46. See Moshiashwili, supra note 29, at 1439.
47. Id. at 1440.
48. Wishnie, supra note 35, at 1722-23. 
49. Id. at 1723 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a) (2012)).
50. Victoria Hadfield Moshiashwili & Aaron Hadfield Moshiashwili, Rearranging Deck
Chairs on the Titanic: Lessons from the History of VA’s Growing Disability Claims Backlog
12 (Oct. 31, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=1952070 [https://perma.cc/ZA7S-JJCG].
51. See Moshiashwili, supra note 29, at 1441. Furthermore, a claimant’s Board decision
cannot be “worsened” by the CAVC. Benjamin Pomerance, Fighting on Too Many Fronts:
Concerns Facing Elderly Veterans in Navigating the United States Department of Veterans
Affairs Benefits System, 37 HAMLINE L. REV. 19, 42 (2014). In other words, if the veteran
received a disability rating of 50 percent, the CAVC cannot rate it at anything lower than 50
percent on appeal. See id.
52. Pomerance, supra note 51, at 42.
53. See SHEDD, supra note 37, at 4; Moshiashwili, supra note 29, at 1442. “[T]he Federal
Circuit can only review questions of law, including constitutional challenges and, less
frequently, challenges to VA rulemaking under the [Administrative Procedure Act].” Id. at
1442.
54. Michael P. Allen, The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims at Twenty:
A Proposal for a Legislative Commission to Consider Its Future, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 361, 377
(2009). 
55. Pomerance, supra note 51, at 49.
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183 days; 136 days for the Board; and 416 days for the CAVC.56 In
total, the average time between the claim’s initial filing to the
ultimate disposition can take between five to seven years.57
There are several reasons why the backlog in the VA system has
ballooned over the past decade. In some sense, the delay is “inherent
in the VA system.”58 The VA system’s pro-claimant setup, and the
favorable attitude towards the veteran’s claim, naturally slows
down the process. For example, the VA must provide the veteran
with one full year to submit more evidence and information follow-
ing to substantiate a claim.59 Furthermore, the VA’s role is not just
adjudicatory. The VA’s process may need to slow down so that it can
help the veteran obtain relevant records from the federal govern-
ment, or even provide the veteran a medical examination.60 Most
judges send claims back to the RO for more thorough review, which
puts the claims on a “hamster wheel”61 just going around and
around from one agency to another.62
The veterans themselves also delay the process. Because there is
no concept of “res judicata,”63 veterans can keep appealing or re-
starting their claims until they get a favorable decision.64 Even
though close to three-quarters of the veterans who have appealed
the VA’s decisions are already receiving disability compensation,
56. Allen, supra note 54, at 377.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., How Can We Force VA to Act on My Claim?, VETERANS BENEFIT GROUP:
GOODMAN ALLEN DONNELLY, http://veteransbenefitgroup.com/how-can-we-force-va-to-act-on-
my-claim-it-is-taking-forever-to-make-a-decision/ [https://perma.cc/P434-297P].
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See Serota & Singer, supra note 18, at 391.
62. See Zarembo, supra note 17. In 2007, the Board remanded 36 percent of all cases that
it had received to another VA body (which then “adds more than a year to the appellate
process”). Allen, supra note 54, at 378 (quoting BD. OF VETERANS’ APPEALS, DEP’T OF VETERANS
AFFAIRS, REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN: FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 3 (2007), http://www.va.
gov/vetapp/chairRpt/BVA2007AR.pdf). Once the case is reviewed, 75 percent of the cases
return to the Board for more proceedings. Id.
63. Res judicata, or claim preclusion, “is the principle that a cause of action may not be
relitigated once it has been judged on the merits.” Res judicata, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/res_judicata [https://perma.cc/4D5N-KXEY].
64. See Zarembo, supra note 17 (“[Veterans] have everything to gain and little to lose by
continuing to fight.”).
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they may continue appealing in hopes of receiving higher disability
compensation.65
There are also external factors that affect the VA’s adjudication
process speed. There has been a steep increase in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan war veterans’ claims. Since 2001, in just one decade, the
number of claims filed doubled from half a million claims to ap-
proximately 1.3 million claims.66 Every claim includes paperwork,
and at times a claim file could have more than a thousand pages.67
Furthermore, the VA is understaffed.68 For example, only sixty-five
board judges ruled on 55,713 cases in fiscal year 2014.69 Because
the system is “non-adversarial” and “claimant-friendly,” if a veter-
an makes an error in the application process, then the VA must
perform additional administrative work which creates additional
work for an already understaffed system.70
In all, it seems that these backlog issues stem from the fact that
cases are treated on a case-by-case basis with no hard, defined rules.
The fact that backlog issues are individualized further supports the
contention that class actions would not be able to address this prob-
lem.71 Instead, these backlog issues show that expanding prec-
edential opinions are the way forward. Particularly, precedential
opinions will help draw clearer lines distinguishing between sit-
uations that merit and do not merit a grant of benefits.72 Because
unclear rules exacerbate the backlog problem, Congress and the
CAVC should consider several solutions to resolve this issue.73
65. See id.
66. Pomerance, supra note 51, at 51.
67. Id.; see also JOHN S. KIERNAN & MICHAEL P. RICHTER, ASS’N B. CITY N.Y., RECOM-
MENDATIONS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED TO THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION REGARDING WAYS
TO IMPROVE THE DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS CLAIMS AND ADJUDICATION PROCESS 2
(2017), http://s3.amazonaws.com/documents.nycbar.org/files/20073221-VATrumpTransition_
COMAJ_FINAL_1.25.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/KX6B-YP9E] (“The paperwork contained within
the file that a claim adjudicator must review before issuing a decision on a claim can consist
of hundreds and, sometimes, thousands of pages of medical and personnel records.”).
68. Federal Hiring Freeze Poses Problems for Understaffed VA Despite Exemptions, LAW
FIRM NEWSWIRE (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.lawfirmnewswire.com/2017/03/federal-hiring-
freeze-poses-problems-for-understaffed-va-despite-exemptions/ [https://perma.cc/E8H4-
LQGH].
69. See Zarembo, supra note 17.
70. Pomerance, supra note 51, at 51-53.
71. See infra Part I.C.
72. See infra Part II.
73. See infra Part III.
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C. Why Class Actions Are Insufficient to Remedy the Situation
At first glance, a class action lawsuit may seem to be the ideal
solution to resolve the backlog problem in the Veterans Benefits
Administration.74 In Article III courts, a potential “class” must sat-
isfy Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to be certified:
(a) numerosity, (b) commonality, (c) typicality, and (d) adequacy.75
But, even to get to the point of certifying a class—let alone obtaining
a favorable result—veteran claimants would need to overcome mul-
tiple challenges.
Assuming that the CAVC were to adopt a class action rule similar
to Rule 23, the “commonality” prong would be difficult to satisfy.
Commonality requires that the issue stem from the same source.76
Veterans who want to form a class action suit regarding backlogs do
not share the same “common” incident: two veterans could have
been denied the opportunity to receive benefits for more than five
years, but one veteran could have filed an original claim based on
an Iraq War knee injury, while another veteran could have filed an
underlying claim based on PTSD from the Vietnam War. Although
both veterans may have been denied benefits for more than five
years, it would be difficult to group them into one category.77
Furthermore, if the length of time claimants were denied benefits
differed, it would be questionable whether a veteran with a ten-
month delay could be categorized with another veteran who had
been waiting for a VA decision for thirty-six months. Hence, the
commonality requirement would be too broad and too narrow at the
same time to provide a solution to the backlog problem.
Even if a class were certified, it would not guarantee that class
actions would be pursued at the CAVC. For example, a 2017 Yale
Law Journal article identified only two Article I courts and seven
74. Some advantages include: “[m]ore powerful litigation posture” for plaintiffs, increased
opportunities for settlements, and “[a]voidance of inconsistent results.” See Kenneth S.
Canfield, Advantages and Disadvantages of Class Actions from a Plaintiff ’s Lawyer’s
Perspective, BRIEF, Summer 1999, at 58, 61.
75. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
76. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 475-79 (2008) (class action
lawsuit filed for economic injury due to an oil spill).
77. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349-50 (2011) (“Commonality
requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members ‘have suffered the same injury.’”).
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agencies that “permit class actions,” five of which “did not have any
reported decisions involving [Rule 23]’s use.”78 Considering the
difficulties in satisfying the threshold questions and the possible
hesitancy to invoke the class action procedures, class action lawsuits
are not sufficient to resolve the backlog issue at the CAVC.
II. THE BENEFITS OF PRECEDENTIAL OPINIONS
Broadly speaking, class action lawsuits and expanding precedent
essentially serve the same purpose—they each give relief to a wide
group of people in an efficient and economic manner.79 Although
claimants file lawsuits to obtain a remedy,80 precedential opinions
assist claimants because they eliminate obstacles that prevent a
timely remedy.81 Precedential opinions clarify the rules, and thus
would allow veterans to bring their claims under a better-defined
system of law82 and cut back on the time spent on litigation.83
Binding opinions would create more efficiency and consistency
throughout the adjudicatory system and reduce the overall number
of appeals.84 Precedential opinions would also discourage claimants
from bringing forward or appealing unmeritorious claims.85 With
fewer appeals, the claims that merit a decision would move through
the dockets faster, and thus, veterans would be provided with faster
relief.86 Hence, binding precedent would help reduce the backlog in
the VA adjudicatory system.
78. See Michael Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, Inside the Agency Class Action,
126 YALE L.J. 1634, 1659 (2017).
79. See, e.g., Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155 (1982); Nuno Garoupa
& Andrew P. Morriss, The Fable of the Codes: The Efficiency of the Common Law, Legal
Origins, and Codification Movements, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1443, 1459, 1466 (critiquing
various theories concerning the “efficiency of the common law”).
80. See Stephen Meili, Collective Justice or Personal Gain? An Empirical Analysis of
Consumer Class Action Lawyers and Named Plaintiffs, 44 AKRON L. REV. 67, 72 (2011).
81. See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A
Supply-Side Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1551, 1580 (2003). 
82. See id.
83. See id. at 1580-81.
84. See id.
85. See James D. Ridgway et al., “Not Reasonably Debatable”: The Problems with Single-
Judge Decisions by the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, 27 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 10-
11 (2016) (describing that single-judge dispositions, which the CAVC employs, are associated
with filing unmeritous claims and appeals).
86. See Zywicki, supra note 81, at 1580-81.
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A. Nature of the CAVC
Although other federal appellate courts decide appeals through
three-judge panels,87 the CAVC was established with a unique prac-
tice: the court is able to “hear cases by judges sitting alone or in
panels, as determined pursuant to procedures established by the
Court.”88 Most CAVC cases are decided by a single judge.89 Initially,
Congress believed that having single-judge rulings was necessary
for fear that appeals would overwhelm the court.90 Not only were
single-judge decisions perceived as a way to prevent further back-
logs in the VA system,91 it was also viewed as a quick way to re-
spond to pro se litigants’ many unmeritorious claims.92 The court
held in Frankel v. Derwinski that, if “the case on appeal is of rela-
tive simplicity,”93 the CAVC may decide that a single-judge decision
is warranted when the case:
1. does not establish a new rule of law;
2. does not alter, modify, criticize, or clarify an existing rule of
law;
3. does not apply an established rule of law to a novel fact
situation;
4. does not constitute the only recent, binding precedent on a
particular point of law within the power of the Court to decide;
5. does not involve a legal issue of continuing public interest; and
87. VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL, supra note 30, § 15.6.1.
88. 38 U.S.C. § 7254(b) (2012). This method of adjudication was likely modeled after the
U.S. Tax Court—where the court allowed single judges to hear cases—because “many matters
had little value as precedent.” Ridgway et al., supra note 85, at 6, 12.
89. Between October 1, 2013, and September 30, 2014, 6439 cases were decided by a
single judge or by the clerk of a court, and only 108 cases were decided by a panel or en banc.
See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, ANNUAL REPORT: UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS OCTOBER 1, 2013 TO SEPTEMBER 30, 2014 ¶ 4 (2014)
[hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT], https://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/FY2014Annual
Report06MAR15FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/A84Y-83UU].
90. See Ronald L. Smith, The Administration of Single-Judge Decisional Authority by the
United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 279, 279 (2004).
91. Between October 1, 2013, and September 30, 2014, the median time from filing an
appeal to disposition by a single judge was 14.1 months, whereas it took 23.5 months for
multiple-judge decisions. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 89, ¶ 6(C)-(D).
92. See Ridgway et al., supra note 85, at 10.
93. Frankel v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 23, 25 (1990).
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6. the outcome is not reasonably debatable.94
To apply this rule, the CAVC employs a screening judge to access
the Frankel criteria and determine whether a single judge can
review the claims.95 Once the Frankel criteria are satisfied, the
screening judge affirms, reverses, or remands the Board’s decision.96
When the single judge circulates the proposed decisions, other judg-
es then have five days to submit their input, including a request for
panel consideration; if at least two judges request a panel review,
then the court creates a panel to review the case.97 Unless judges
request a panel review, the screening judge’s decision then becomes
binding on only the parties to the case.98
Because of the simple decision-making process, single-judge
decisions have no precedential weight.99 Binding opinions only re-
solved 1.8 percent of the cases brought before the CAVC in fiscal
years 2013 and 2014.100 Other federal appellate courts issue on
average 12 percent of their decisions as binding opinions.101
B. Merits of Nonbinding Decisions
Not having binding precedent has certain merits. Single-judge
decision proponents contend that nonbinding decisions address
resource concerns and increase judges’ efficiency in the decision-
making process.102 With the growing number of claims that are
brought to court, there is an increasing demand for publication,
shelf space, time, and decisionmakers; by opting not to create bind-
ing decisions, these concerns are abated.103
94. Id. at 25-26.
95. See Smith, supra note 90, at 280.
96. Id.
97. Id. 
98. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS INTERNAL OPERATING
PROCEDURES ¶¶ II(b)(4), III(a)(4) [hereinafter IOPS], https://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/
documents/ IOPSep21_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/NX2J-VHD6].
99. Bethea v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 252, 254 (1992).
100. See Ridgway et al., supra note 85, at 11. 
101. Id. 
102. See id. at 13 (quoting Stephen L. Wasby, Unpublished Decisions in the Federal Courts
of Appeals: Making the Decision to Publish, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 325, 333-34 (2001)).
103. See id. at 12-13.
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 One of the main concerns with binding decisions is the increased
burden on judges. Nationally, the number of judges has not in-
creased, but the number of cases brought to federal courts of appeals
has ballooned from roughly 11,000 cases in 1970 to approximately
60,000 in 2002.104 Proponents argue that nonbinding decisions take
the pressure off of producing elaborate and detailed decisions.105
Furthermore, a telephone conference between a staff attorney and
the parties allow decisions to be made “on truncated memoranda or
motions for summary disposition and responses in lieu of briefs.”106
Nonbinding decisions can help judges delegate most of the prepa-
ration of those less-influential opinions to clerks and staff, and thus
redirect their energy to opinions that require more attention.107
C. The Downside of Having Limited Precedential Opinions
Single-judge decisions have some acknowledged drawbacks. They
“creat[e] an ‘iceberg jurisprudence’ ... with ... much of its law ‘below
the surface.’”108 With little precedent, rules are applied inconsis-
tently by those who implement them at the agency, thus creating
large variance in outcomes.109 Some veterans may appeal cases just
because they believe that a different judge would render a different
decision.110 There is also inconsistent application of the Frankel
104. See id. at 13 (quoting David C. Vladecka & Mitu Gulati, Judicial Triage: Reflections
on the Debate over Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1667, 1668 n.2 (2005)).
105. Preparing opinions through a panel hearing requires more time for drafting, editing,
and polishing. See Lauren S. Wood, Comment, Out of Cite, Out of Mind: Navigating the
Labyrinth that Is State Appellate Courts’ Unpublished Opinion Practices, 45 U. BALT. L. REV.
561, 573-74 (2016).
106. Frankel v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 23, 26 (1990); see Ridgway et al., supra note 85, at
12-13.
107. But cf. Ridgway et al., supra note 85, at 14-16 (including the practice of judges
delegating more work to clerks in a discussion of criticisms of unpublished opinions made by
academics and judges).
108. Id. at 18 (quoting Michael P. Allen, Significant Developments in Veterans Law (2004-
2006) and What They Reveal About the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 483, 515 (2007)). 
109. See id. at 14, 25.
110. One study reviewed the affirmance rate of BVA cases brought to the CAVC between
2013 and 2014. See Ridgway et al., supra note 85, at 3-4, 18, 20-22. The study found that there
was a large variance of affirmance rates: one judge affirmed BVA cases at a rate of 26 percent,
while another affirmed at a rate of 65 percent, which suggest that such discrepancy is not
merely by chance. See id. at 25-26. But see id. at 19-20 (“[T]here is little reason to believe that
veterans are able to effectively monitor the courts and call attention to any deficiencies in its
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criteria.111 For example, the “reasonably debatable” criterion is
inconsistently satisfied—a study showed that a case’s outcome
differed depending on which judge was assigned the case.112 The
likelihood of a case having two different outcomes suggests that the
case concerned a “reasonably debatable” issue and thus a panel
should have decided the matter rather than a single judge.113 In
bypassing the opportunities to define a rule by rendering binding
precedents, judges are forced to address and interpret rules for
similar issues over and over again.114 Until recently, nonprece-
dential cases could not even be cited for their persuasive value.115
Even if precedential opinions created more rules or increased
nuance in the rules, it is better to have a body of law that has more
precedents than too few.116 The increased nuance from precedential
opinions counters the argument that some judicial opinions simply
repeat past holdings without adding or changing the law. In fact,
nuance validates each rule’s strength because it clarifies the
strength and limits of a rule by “add[ing] ... slight expansion of the
rule to a certain set of facts” or by “limit[ing] ... the law to a certain
set of facts.”117 In other words, those laws that slightly tweak or
present law as time goes on justifies the law’s existence. “‘[T]he doc-
trine of precedent is like a pointillist painting with judicial opinions
as the carefully placed points providing depth,’ and ... when some of
the points are removed, the overall picture is made less distinct, its
contours less clear.”118 Hence, increasing the amount of published,
binding opinions would greatly benefit the VA. The challenges that
work.”).
111. See VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL, supra note 30, § 15.6.1.
112. See id.
113. See Ridgway et al., supra note 85, at 20-26; see also Frankel v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App.
23, 25-26 (1990).
114. See Zywicki, supra note 81, at 1580.
115. U.S. VET. APP. R. 30(a) (2018) (“A party ... may not cite as precedent any action
designated as nonprecedential by the Court or any other court.”). Now, nonprecedential cases
“may be cited only for the persuasive value of their logic and reasoning, provided that the
party states that no clear precedent exists.” Id.
116. See, e.g., Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Submerged Precedent, 16 NEV. L.J. 515, 574 (2016).
117. David R. Cleveland, Overturning the Last Stone: The Final Step in Returning
Precedential Status to All Opinions, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 61, 163 (2009).
118. See id. at 164 (quoting Jon A. Strongman, Comment, Unpublished Opinions,
Precedent, and the Fifth Amendment: Why Denying Unpublished Opinions Precedential Value
is Unconstitutional, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 195, 195 (2001)).
2019] CREATING PRECEDENTS AT THE CAVC 2327
stem from having limited precedential opinions outweighs non-
binding precedent’s merits.
III. SOLUTIONS FOR CREATING MORE PRECEDENTIAL OPINIONS
In order to enable more precedential decisions, the VA should
consider two options: (1) increasing the number of judges, without
placing a maximum limit, through congressional action; and (2) cre-
ating a new mechanism to turn nonbinding opinions into binding
opinions.
A. Increasing Judges at the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
 Without a Ceiling
Congress could reevaluate the role of active and retired judges to
enable more precedential opinions. To enable the CAVC to render
precedential opinions, the court would need to form panels to make
these decisions.119 Hence, an environment conducive to forming
panels is necessary.
1. Current Statutory Provisions Regarding Active and Retired
 Judges
A federal statute states that the CAVC is composed of “at least
three and not more than seven judges.”120 Unlike Article III judges,
CAVC judges operate on fifteen-year fixed terms.121 The statute has
twice permitted temporary expansions to increase the CAVC to nine
judges in 2005.122 However, these were just temporary measures and
the effects of this statute are slowly fading out.123 The current
statute provides that new appointments cannot be made if it would
result in there being more than seven CAVC judges.124
119. See Smith, supra note 90, at 279-81.
120. 38 U.S.C. § 7253(a) (2012).
121. Id. § 7253(c).
122. Id. § 7253(h)(1), (i)(1); Four New Judges Join the CAVC, VETERANS L.J., Winter 2005,
at 1, 2, http://www.cavcbar.net/Winter_2005.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9WS-MK7H].
123. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 89, ¶ 15. There are currently nine active judges on
the court. Judges, U.S. COURT APPEALS VETERANS’ CLAIMS, https://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/
judges.php [https://perma.cc/7G4Z-ZSFW].
124. 38 U.S.C. § 7253(a), (i)(2) (2012).
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In addition to temporarily increasing the number of active judges,
the Chief Judge has the authority to recall retired judges to serve
on the court, and this authority has been exercised previously.125
Although recalling retired judges is “helpful” and enables the court
to “build on the [judges’] gained experiences,”126 recalled judges
cannot exercise the same authority as active judges.127 Retired
judges who have been recalled can only serve for a maximum of
ninety days128 and are not allowed to vote on en banc review.129 Fur-
thermore, recalling retired judges poses logistical problems—there
is not enough space or financing at the court to set up chambers
with staff to support these recalled judges.130
2. Proposing a Statutory Amendment
Congressional action is necessary to give judges more oppor-
tunities to create more precedential opinions. Congress should con-
sider adopting a revised statute that would permanently increase
the number of judges,131 without putting a ceiling on the number of
judges, even though it would inevitably require a budget increase.132
A ceiling serves no purpose—not even the U.S. Constitution puts a
limit on the number of federal judges.133 Although the Supreme
125. Id. § 7257(b)(1); see The Challenges Facing the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Disability Assistance & Mem’l Affairs of the Comm.
on Veterans’ Affairs H.R., 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of John J. Hall, Chairman, sub-
committee on Disability Assistance and Memorial Affairs) (referring to the recall of five
retired judges).
126.  The Challenges Facing the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, supra note 125
(statement of Hon. William P. Greene, Jr., Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims).
127. 38 U.S.C. § 7257(b)(1)-(2) (2012); IOPS, supra note 98, ¶ VII(b)(1)(A).
128. § 7257(b)(1).
129. IOPS, supra note 98, ¶ VII(b)(1)(A).
130. See The Challenges Facing the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, supra note
125 (statement of Hon. William P. Greene, Jr., Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims).
131. There is a Senate bill that proposes to permanently increase the number of judges to
nine. See Veterans Court of Appeals Support Act of 2015, S. 1754, 114th Cong. § 2(a) (2015).
One article proposes an increase to thirteen judges. See Ridgway et al., supra note 85, at 43.
132. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, S. 1014 EMERGENCY JUDICIAL RELIEF ACT OF 2011,
at 2-3 (2011), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/112th-congress-2011-2012/costestimate/
s10140.pdf [https://perma.cc/MR56-DBQL]. But see George Everly, III & Michael L. Shenk-
man, District Judges as Investments, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 59, 61 (2016).
133. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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Court and the highest court in most states typically hear cases en
banc,134 most appellate courts (including the CAVC) hear cases in
panels or as single judges.135 When cases are heard in panels, it does
not matter whether a court has nine judges or fifteen judges because
the panel composition is predetermined.136 There is no fear that a
decision’s outcome would result in a “court packing” scheme.137
Aside from situations where an en banc review is required,138 the
number of judges in the CAVC has no negative impact on the court’s
decision-making power; hence, an arbitrary restriction within the
statute is unnecessary.139
3. Counterarguments and Justifications
Practical limits would prevent any sudden, exponential increase
in the number of judges. First, financial, logistical, and resource
constraints would prevent the court from suddenly increasing
judges to an unreasonable degree.140 Budgets and limits on physical
space would help maintain judges at a reasonable number.141
Second, even if claims were to decrease over the years, and oppo-
nents thought there were too many active judges, the fifteen-year
service limit would enable the court to gradually decrease the
number of judges on the bench.142
134. Yosh Halberstam, Trial and Error: Decision Reversal and Panel Size in State Courts,
32 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 94, 94-95 (2016).
135. See Ridgway et al., supra note 85, at 10-11, 11 n.49.
136. IOPS, supra note 98, ¶ V(b)(1).
137. LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A CHANGING AMERICA
451-52 (6th ed. 2007).
138. Out of 3686 cases that were appealed to the CAVC in 2014, only one case was decided
en banc, so gathering all of the CAVC judges would be a very rare occurrence. See ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 89, ¶ 5.
139. See, e.g., ALICIA BANNON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, TESTIMONY OF ALICIA BANNON
ON S. 1385, FEDERAL JUDGESHIP ACT OF 2013, at 2 (2013), https://www.brennancenter.org/
sites/default/files/analysis/Federal%20Judgeship%20Act%20Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9YWZ-U7ND] (demonstrating how the number of district judges must continually increase
as caseloads rise).
140. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 132, at 2-3.
141. See Rory E. Riley, Preservation, Modification, or Transformation? The Current State
of the Department of Veterans Affairs Disability Benefits Adjudication Process and Why
Congress Should Modify, Rather than Maintain or Completely Redesign, the Current System,
18 FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 20 (2008).
142. See 38 U.S.C. § 7253(c) (2012).
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Another reason to increase the number of judges on the CAVC is
that it is a specialized, Article I court,143 so it cannot invite other
federal court judges to sit by designation.144 Thus, the CAVC cannot
reach out to other courts’ judges to sit on panels; the court is re-
stricted to the current active judges and the recall-eligible retired
judges.145 At this moment, there are only nine active judges.146 Even
if the CAVC were able to invite other federal judges by designation,
the rules and substance of the claims brought to the CAVC are spe-
cific to veterans’ issues and veterans law so guest judges might not
have enough knowledge to adjudicate these claims.147
4. Alternative Proposal: Expanding the Role of Retired Judges
If Congress is hesitant to suddenly increase the number of active
judges, it should at least consider expanding retired judges’ author-
ity.148 Although the current rules enable the CAVC to recall retired
judges, their service is limited.149 The limits on recalled retired
judges pertaining to the time period they can serve or the scope of
their authority should be removed. But if Congress were to limit
retired recalled judges, it should consider tasking these judges with
specific assignments, such as only sitting in on panel decisions.150
The CAVC needs to have a larger pool of active judges available
so that more panels can be created. Panels would enable the court
to render more precedential opinions.151 With the current situation,
in which there are only nine active judges and over 4000 new claims
143. See Welcome, U.S. COURT APPEALS VETERANS CLAIMS, http://www.uscourts.
cavc.gov/index.php [https://perma.cc/G9XW-STZM].
144. See 28 U.S.C. § 292(a) (2012); Ridgway et al., supra note 85, at 44.
145. See Ridgway et al., supra note 85, at 44-45 (“In 2014, senior and visiting judges
provided almost a quarter of the judge labor in the federal appellate courts of general ju-
risdiction. This amounts to fifty-one extra judges beyond the authorized strength of those
courts.”).
146. See Judges, supra note 123 (noting that, currently, there are nine active judges, eight
senior judges, and two retired judges).
147. See Ridgway et al., supra note 85, at 45.
148. See 28 U.S.C. § 294(a)-(b) (2012) (“Any judge ... who has retired ... may continue to
perform such judicial duties as he is willing and able to undertake.”).
149. See 38 U.S.C. § 7257(b)(1).
150. See infra Part III.B.
151. See Smith, supra note 90, at 280-81.
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to address each year,152 it is understandable that the court would be
reluctant to create panels.153 Thus, Congress should consider ex-
panding retired recalled judges’ scope and authority.154
B. Mechanism to Convert Nonprecedential Opinions to
 Precedential Opinions: Formation of a Special Reviewing
 Process
The court could also create a mechanism through which non-
precedential opinions could be converted into precedential opinions
to establish more precedent. For example, a Federal Circuit Rule
provides that “[w]ithin [sixty] days after any nonprecedential
opinion or order is issued, any person may request, with accompany-
ing reasons, that the opinion or order be reissued as precedential.”155
The CAVC should consider adopting a similar rule. This rule allows
“any person” to bring forward a request.156 When applied in this
context, the rule would allow a third party157 who thinks that an
opinion or order would work in her favor to bring forward a request
so long as it is within sixty days.158
 Furthermore, the Federal Circuit Rules make precedential dis-
positions the default, unless the panel specifically states that the
disposition is not to be cited as precedent.159 A rule that creates
automatic precedents would not be ideal in the CAVC because too
152. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 89, ¶ 15; Judges, supra note 123.
153. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. In 2014, the median time for disposition by
a single-judge was 14.1 months, whereas it took 23.5 months for multiple-judge decisions. See
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 89, at ¶ 6(C)-(D).
154. The budget for the CAVC will also need to be increased in order to provide more staff
support to the new judges, to pay for salary and pensions, and to expand the physical space
and create new chambers. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
155. FED. CIR. R. 32.1(e); see also Elizabeth M. Horton, Comment, Selective Publication and
the Authority of Precedent in the United States Courts of Appeals, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1691, 1697
& nn.23-28 (1995) (“Eight circuits allow parties or interested persons to move, for good cause,
for publication of an opinion previously determined to be unpublished.”).
156. FED. CIR. R. 32.1(e).
157. In fact, the Federal Circuit Rule does consider the request’s effect on third parties. See
id. It requires the requestor to “notify the court and the parties of any case that person knows
to be pending that would be determined or affected by reissuance as precedential. Parties to
pending cases who have a stake in the outcome of a decision to make precedential must be
given an opportunity to respond.” Id. (emphases added).
158. See id.
159. See FED CIR. R. 32.1(a)-(b).
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many precedential opinions may end up producing inflexible
rules.160 But a mechanism that allows nonprecedential opinions to
be converted into precedential opinions, after a period of deliber-
ation, would be helpful.161 Although some scholars are skeptical
about a process to convert nonprecedential CAVC opinions to pre-
cedent because “judges ... alone cannot create new precedents....
[and] [i]n order to make a CAVC single-judge disposition pre-
cedential, the matter would need to be referred to a panel of the
Court for further proceedings,”162 current and retired judges can
create a special reviewing panel to overcome this concern.
1. Justification for Creating a Special Reviewing Process
In many instances, it may be difficult for parties or judges to
decide at first blush whether a decision should be precedential.163
Rather than forcing a single screening judge to make the determi-
nation at the front end of the process, the opinion’s weight should be
reconsidered once a decision is rendered.164 Because there are only
nine active judges on the court,165 who together decided 6547 cases
in fiscal year 2014,166 resources are scarce. So, this new mechanism
160. The CAVC should not automatically consider all dispositions as precedents by default
because of the very different case volumes at the Federal Circuit and the CAVC. For example,
the Federal Circuit terminated 1678 cases between October 2015 and September 2016,
whereas the CAVC disposed of 6547 cases in fiscal year 2014. Compare U.S. COURT APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, YEAR-TO-DATE ACTIVITY AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2016, http://www.
cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the-court/statistics/revYTD_Activity_9.30.16.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AZQ2-4Z6R], with ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 89, ¶ 4.
Furthermore, the majority of cases terminated by the Federal Circuit were from Article I
courts (established through the U.S. Constitution); whereas cases appealed to the CAVC were
from an administrative tribunal, which is set up less formally. See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR
VETERANS CLAIMS, COURT PROCESS, https://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/CourtProcess
Full.pdf [https://perma.cc/27U6-TFRX]; YEAR-TO-DATE ACTIVITY AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2016,
supra.
161. See, e.g., Thomas Froats, Unrepresentative Randomization: An Empirical Study of
Judging Panels of USPTO Appeals to the CAFC, 19 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 79, 91-92 (2010)
(“[I]t may be difficult or even impossible to determine prior to the assignment of judging
panels if a case will become precedential or not.”).
162. See Smith, supra note 90, at 281.
163. See, e.g., Froats, supra note 161, at 91-92.
164. See id.
165. See Judges, supra note 123.
166. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 89, ¶ 4.
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considers the type of cases brought to review, the formation of the
reviewing panel, and the timing of the reviewing process.
2. How the Special Reviewing Process Works
The new reviewing process for converting nonprecedential opin-
ions to precedential opinions would work in the following way. First,
the CAVC would adopt a new rule akin to Federal Circuit Rule
32.1(e).167 The rule would allow any person—the parties, the gov-
ernment, third parties, or even other judges—to file a request that
a nonprecedential opinion be converted into a precedential
opinion.168 The reviewing panel would then review the recommended
case and assess its likely effect. The panel would then clarify the
legal issues and ultimately decide on a new binding, legal standard.
Two recall-eligible retired judges and one active judge should sit
on the reviewing panel. Because the retired judges would have had
fifteen years on the court,169 they would be the most experienced in
identifying the legal issues that need clarification. Including an
active judge (ideally one who had dealt with the issue that was
raised to the panel review) would create continuity. Moreover, the
panels can be composed based on the topic that the panels will
discuss to create more efficiency and expertise. Perhaps some judges
are more used to handling issues regarding post-traumatic stress
disorder claims, whereas others have rendered more opinions on
total disability ratings based on individual unemployability. Hence,
mixing judges with different backgrounds and years of experience
would create a robust and thorough reviewing system that would
help pave the way to establishing precedential opinions.
The reviewing process could happen either as frequently as once
every quarter, or as little as once a year.170 Furthermore, the judges
167. See FED. CIR. R. 32.1(e).
168. For nonparties who file a request, this may seem to pose a “case” or “controversy”
issue because it is similar to asking the judges to issue an advisory opinion, but by creating
a rule similar to Federal Circuit Rule 32.1, this reviewing process can be viewed as an
extension of the appeals process and so it would not be treated as a new and separate claim.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
169. See 38 U.S.C. § 7253(c) (2012).
170. Because the reviewing process would aggregate the same issues from different cases,
the rule should provide an “appealing” period of at least 365 days, rather than the 60 days
provided by the Federal Circuit Rule. See FED. CIR. R. 32.1(e). 
2334 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:2311
could decide whether there should be multiple reviewing processes
that go on simultaneously, or if there should only be one active
panel review at a time.
Because there are currently eight recall-eligible retired judges171
and nine active judges,172 if one active judge and two retired judges
were to compose a panel, then the court would immediately have
four panels. Five active judges would have no panel duty. If only one
panel were to meet once a year—discussing only one issue—then it
could create a minimum of one precedential opinion. An active judge
would only have to serve once every eight years in this scenario, and
a retired judge would only have to serve once every two years. If all
four panels were to meet once every quarter—addressing only one
issue per meeting—the court would have sixteen precedential opin-
ions. This would require an active judge to sit on a panel twice a
year, and a retired judge would have to sit in every review process.
Depending on the reviewing process’s frequency, the new mechan-
ism would allow the court to render up to sixteen binding opinions
which would be a 25 percent increase in the number of precedential
opinions at the CAVC.173
CONCLUSION
Veterans face delays at every step of the process. They need a
solution to the backlog problem that has prevented thousands of
them from obtaining quick and efficient justice. The CAVC would
have to expend lots of time and resources if it were to create new
rules for class action lawsuits and certifying classes. Instead, the
CAVC should use its limited resources to improve the current
situation.
Thus, the VA should consider increasing the number of prece-
dential opinions because this would create a more streamlined pro-
cess for cases on appeal. Having a clearer set of legal rules would
help the court make quicker decisions, and it would also discourage
claimants from bringing forward unmeritorious claims. Although
171. See Judges, supra note 123.
172. See id. 
173. Between fiscal years 2013-2014, the CAVC issued 75 published opinions, so 16 new
precedential opinions would be a 25 percent increase. See Ridgway et al., supra note 85, at 11.
2019] CREATING PRECEDENTS AT THE CAVC 2335
the proposed plans would require an increased budget, they would
allow for a realistic approach to decrease the backlog.174
To expand the number of precedents, one proposal is to encourage
congressional action that revises the statute governing the number
of judges. Generally, an increase in the number of judges will help
the court decide more cases.175 Even if the court were to maintain
the current number of judges, Congress could consider increasing
and expanding recall-eligible judges’ authority.176 If these judges can
help form panels, then, naturally, the court would be able to in-
crease the number of precedential opinions.177 Furthermore, setting
up a new mechanism that allows the court to convert certain
“nonbinding” opinions to “binding” opinions would also increase
precedential opinions.178 Rather than focusing energy on class action
lawsuits at the CAVC, the VA should issue more binding, pre-
cedential opinions to tackle the backlog problem.
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176. See supra Part III.A.4.
177. See supra Part III.B.
178. See supra Part III.B.
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